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ANTITRUST-ROBNSON-PATMAN ACT-No SALT ADDED: THE
SUPREME COURT PROMOTES HEALTHY COMPETITION BY TAKING THE SALT
OUT OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT. Volvo v. Reeder-Simco, 126 S. Ct.
860 (2006).
I. INTRODUCTION
"Judicial Activism" is a term frequently used in jurisprudential debates,
yet there is not a clear consensus on the definition of the term.' One form of
judicial activism occurs when a member of the judiciary invalidates a piece
of properly enacted legislation.2 Scholars criticize this form of judicial activ-
ism because it gives credence to an elite minority's viewpoint, rather than
giving deference to the majority's will. 3 Another form of judicial activism
occurs when a judge refuses to follow horizontal precedent.4 Rather than
criticize this form of activism, however, scholars have deemed it an appro-
priate exercise of the judiciary's constitutional authority.5
In Volvo v. Reeder Simco,6 the Supreme Court narrowed the breadth of
the Robinson-Patman Act ("Act"),7 a seventy-year-old federal antitrust sta-
tute prohibiting price discrimination.8 Although the Court's decision is an
activist one, 9 the Court's activism is laudable because it overruled erroneous
horizontal precedent. 0 Ideally, the legislature should have corrected the
Court's error," but legislative action in this case was improbable due to pub-
lic resentment toward large corporations. 2 Moreover, the complexity of
antitrust policies called for judicial action to ensure that the Robinson-
Patman Act coincided with the broader goals of antitrust policy. 3
1. Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of "Judicial Activism," 92
CAL. L. REv. 1441, 1443 (2004) (discussing how the definition of judicial activism varies
depending on the context in which it is used).
2. Id. at 1463.
3. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 17 (1991).
4. Kmiec, supra note 1, at 1467. The doctrine of horizontal precedent requires a court
to follow its past precedents. Id.
5. Id. at 1468.
6. 126 S. Ct. 860 (2006).
7. Margaret M. Zwisler, Volvo Trucks v. Reeder-Simco: Judicial Activism at the Su-
preme Court?, ANTITRUST, Summer 2006, at 40, 43.
8. See Discrimination in Price, Services, or Facilities, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006).
9. See Zwisler, supra note 7, at 43.
10. See discussion infra Part V.A.
11. Zwisler, supra note 7, at 43.
12. See discussion infra Part V.B.
13. See discussion infra Part V.C.
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This note explores how the Court's decision in Volvo furthers the prin-
ciple that the judiciary should correct flawed antitrust policy.'4 First, the
note outlines the facts giving rise to the type of price discrimination claim
arising in Volvo. 5 Next, it examines the background of price discrimination
jurisprudence. 6 Following the background section, the Court's reasoning in
Volvo merits examination. 7 The note concludes by examining the signific-
ance of Volvo, specifically addressing the desirability of judicial activism in
Volvo and future antitrust cases.
18
II. FACTS
Reeder-Simco ("Reeder") sued Volvo in February of 2000, alleging
that Volvo engaged in price discrimination by giving Reeder's competitors
greater price concessions than the price concessions given to Reeder. 9 To
provide a factual background for the Supreme Court's decision in Volvo,
this section reviews Reeder's relationship with Volvo, 20 the facts giving rise
to Reeder's lawsuit,2 and the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.22
A. Reeder's History with Volvo
Reeder was a dealer of Class 8 trucks, selling exclusively Volvo-
manufactured trucks. 23 Reeder's agreement with Volvo assigned Reeder a
geographic area where Volvo would not place another dealer; however,
Reeder did not have the exclusive right to sell Volvo trucks in the area be-
cause Volvo dealers are allowed to sell trucks anywhere within the United
States.24 Reeder signed a five-year franchise agreement with Volvo, with an
14. See discussion infra Part V.C.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. Reeder-Simco v. Volvo, 374 F.3d 701, 705 (8th Cir. 2004). Reeder's suit alleged
that Volvo violated the Robinson-Patman Act and the Arkansas Franchise Protection Act. Id.
at 704. This case note, however, is limited to the Robinson-Patman Act claim because the
Supreme Court's decision in Volvo addresses only the federal claim. Volvo v. Reeder-Simco,
126 S. Ct. 860, 865 (2006).
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part ll.B.
22. See infra Part II.C.
23. See Brief of Respondent at 6, Volvo v. Reeder-Simco, 126 S. Ct. 860 (2006) (No.
04-905). Class 8 trucks are heavy-duty trucks weighing over 33,000 pounds. Id. at 4. Princip-
al manufacturers of Class 8 trucks, such as Volvo, manufacture base trucks with various
component parts added to meet a customer's particular demand. Id.
24. Id. at 4.
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automatic one-year extension if Reeder met Volvo's sales objectives.25 Vol-
vo could terminate the agreement for cause or if Reeder failed to meet cer-
tain sales objectives.26
As a Volvo dealer, Reeder determined the customer's product specifi-
cations and then negotiated a wholesale truck price from Volvo.27 Volvo
offered Reeder a wholesale price that was eighty percent of the retail price,
but Volvo could reduce the price further by granting certain price conces-
sions. Volvo's district managers determined the size of the concession
Volvo was willing to offer based on the particular truck and the price of
similar trucks that the customer could consider instead of Volvo trucks.29
Once Volvo determined the price concessions, the dealer established the
customer's retail price.30 If the customer accepted the dealer's retail price,
then the dealer purchased the trucks from Volvo. 31
Volvo had 146 authorized dealers during its alleged period of price dis-
crimination.32 During that time, Volvo enacted the "Volvo Vision," which
was the automaker's plan to reduce the number of Volvo dealers to seventy-
five.33 For various reasons, Reeder feared being one of the dealers facing
elimination.34 After the announcement of the "Volvo Vision," Reeder no-
ticed that Volvo increased Reeder's sales objectives while contempora-
neously decreasing Reeder's price concessions.35
Reeder took measures to prevent termination by Volvo, but in 1999,
Volvo issued Reeder a termination letter.36 Since the enactment of the "Vol-
vo Vision," Reeder had gone from a top-performing dealer earlier in the
decade to one of Volvo's worst performing dealers by 1999.37 Reeder be-
lieved that its declining success and eventual termination resulted from Vol-
vo's discriminatory pricing practices.38
25. Reeder-Simco v. Volvo, 374 F.3d. 701, 704 (8th Cir. 2004).
26. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 23, at 6.
27. Id. at 7.
28. Id. at 8-9.
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id. at 7.
31. Id.
32. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 23, at 6.
33. Reeder-Simco v. Volvo, 374 F.3d 701, 705 (8th Cir. 2004).
34. Id. Reeder learned that Volvo was offering other Volvo dealers higher price conces-
sions from faxes mistakenly sent by Volvo to Reeder. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 23, at 12-13.
37. Id. Historically, Reeder had significant success in the Class 8 market, being honored
as one of Volvo GM's top dealers in 1992. Id. at 5.
38. See id. at 13.
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B. Reeder's Claim Against Volvo
To prove price discrimination, Reeder focused on three factual scena-
rios: (1) instances of differing price concessions when Reeder competed
directly against another Volvo dealer, (2) instances in which Reeder bid
successfully when Volvo offered non-competing dealers higher price con-
cessions, and (3) instances in which Reeder bid unsuccessfully when Volvo
offered non-competing dealers higher price concessions.39
First, Reeder presented evidence of instances in which Volvo offered
other Volvo dealers higher price concessions despite a company policy of
granting competing dealers the same concession.4 ° In one transaction, Volvo
offered one of Reeder's competitors a seven and one-half percent price con-
cession; however, the customer did not accept the bid and asked Reeder to
submit a bid.4' Volvo granted Reeder the same price concession, but Reed-
er's bid was higher than the competitor's due to an overall price increase for
the truck model in question.4" After the customer agreed to buy the trucks
from Reeder's competitor, Volvo increased the price concession to offset the
price increase between the time the bid was originally prepared and the time
the bid was accepted.43 In a separate transaction, Reeder and another Volvo
dealer had independent contracts with the same customer, yet the competitor
received a higher price concession from Volvo on its contract than Reeder
had received on its contract. 44
Second, Reeder presented evidence of instances in which Volvo of-
fered non-competing dealers different price concessions on the sale of trucks
of like grade and quality.45 As a result of the differing price concessions,
Reeder's sales of similar trucks were less profitable than the sales of other
Volvo dealers.46
Finally, Reeder presented evidence of instances in which Volvo did not
grant Reeder's requested price concession, and Reeder subsequently lost the
sale.47 During this same period, however, Volvo granted other Volvo dealers
higher price concessions, and those dealers were able to complete the sale. 48
39. See Reeder-Simco v. Volvo, 374 F.3d 701, 705-06 (8th Cir. 2004).
40. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 23, at 13-14.
41. Id. at 14.
42. Id.
43. See id. A Volvo representative testified at trial that Volvo did not offer higher con-
cessions simply because the dealer and customer previously agreed on a price. Id
44. Id. at 15.
45. See Reeder-Simco v. Volvo, 374 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2004).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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Reeder believed that Volvo's pricing practices caused its declining
profits and sales.49 As a result, Reeder commenced legal action against Vol-
vo, alleging that Volvo's pricing practices violated the Robinson-Patman
Act.5" Reeder filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Arkansas, and a jury awarded Reeder $1.3 million in damages,
which the trial court trebled.5' Volvo appealed the district court's judgment
to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.52
C. The Eighth Circuit's Opinion
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict awarding
Reeder $1.3 million for Volvo's Robinson-Patman Act violation.53 The court
of appeals believed that Reeder was engaged in competition with all other
Volvo dealers because Volvo dealers were authorized to sell trucks outside
of their geographic area.54 The court held that Reeder presented sufficient
evidence "for the jury to conclude Volvo's discriminatory concessions re-
sulted in lost profits and sales to Reeder."55 Furthermore, the court held that
Reeder presented sufficient information for the jury to conclude that Vol-
vo's pricing practices caused actual injury to Reeder.5 6 Displeased with the
result, Volvo filed a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court,
seeking a reversal of the Eighth Circuit's ruling.57
III. BACKGROUND
Price discrimination occurs when a seller realizes a different rate of re-
turn on the sale of two or more products.58 Congressman Wright Patman
believed that price discrimination threatened the independent merchant, and
by extension, the public at large. 59 Ultimately, Congress agreed with Con-
49. Volvo v. Reeder-Simco, 126 S. Ct. 860, 866 (2006).
50. Id.
51. Reeder-Simco, 374 F.3d at 707.
52. Id.
53. Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 868.
54. Reeder-Simco, 374 F.3d at 709.
55. Id. at711.
56. See id.
57. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 20, Volvo v. Reeder-Simco, 126 S. Ct. 860 (2006)
(No. 04-905).
58. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 565 (2d ed. 1999). Rate of
return is defined as the ratio of price to marginal cost. Id. As a result, price discrimination
does not occur when the same product is sold at a different price, provided the price differ-
ence is commensurate with the difference in marginal cost. Id. The same product can have
different marginal cost for various reasons, such as the cost associated with having to fulfill
the differing needs of two different customers. Id.
59. See WRIGHT PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 3 (The Ronald Press Co. 1938).
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gressman Patman and passed the Robinson-Patman Act.6° The Robinson-
Patman Act explicitly prohibits sellers from engaging in price discrimination
"between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality...
[when] the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition ... or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition," provided that the
price difference is not attributable to a difference in cost or an attempt to
match a competitor's price.6 ' Any person who is injured because of price
discrimination can sue in federal court and recover treble damages in addi-
tion to attorney's fees and other related litigation expenses.62 In order for a
plaintiff to have a successful Robinson-Patman claim, the plaintiff must
establish (1) the sales were made in interstate commerce, (2) the items sold
were of like grade and quality, (3) the seller discriminated in price, and (4)
the price discrimination injured competition.63
Courts have recognized three categories of competitive injury that gen-
erally give rise to a Robinson-Patman Act claim: primary-line, secondary-
line, and tertiary-line price discrimination. 6' Primary-line price discrimina-
tion occurs when a discriminating seller uses predatory pricing 65 to adverse-
ly affect the discriminating seller's competition.6 6 Secondary-line price dis-
crimination arises when a seller offers the same product at a different price
to competitors in the same market, thereby injuring competition among the
discriminating seller's customers.67 Tertiary-line price discrimination results
when a seller discriminates to the detriment of competition among the pur-
chaser's customers.68
60. Senator Joseph Robinson introduced the bill in the Senate. FREDERICK M. ROWE,
PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 12 (Little, Brown & Co. 1962).
Senator Robinson served Arkansas as a congressman, governor, and senator. Biographical
Directory of the United States Congress, Joseph Taylor Robinson, available at
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=R000347 (last visited Nov. 2, 2006).
Senator Robinson was the Democratic nominee for Vice President in 1928, and from 1933-
1937 Senator Robinson served as the majority leader of the Senate. Id. Congressman Wright
Patman introduced the bill in the House of Representatives. ROWE, supra, at 12. Congress-
man Patman represented the district comprising North-East Texas from March 1929 until his
death in March 1976. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, John William
Wright Patman, available at http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index
=pOOO10 3 (last visited on Nov. 2, 2006).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006).
62. Suits by Persons Injured, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
63. See Texaco v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 556 (1990).
64. Volvo v. Reeder-Simco, 126 S. Ct. 860, 870 (2006).
65. Predatory pricing occurs when a product is offered at a price below the product's
marginal cost. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 58, at 360.
66. See id. at 574.
67. Id.
68. Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 870.
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Volvo involved a claim of secondary-line price discrimination. 69 To un-
derstand secondary-line price discrimination and the significance of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Volvo, this section will analyze (1) the legislative
history of the Robinson-Patman Act,7" (2) the economic ramifications of the
Act,71 and (3) the evolution of price discrimination in key Supreme Court
decisions.72
A. Legislative History of the Robinson-Patman Act
The purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act is to protect the independent
merchant and the public that the merchant serves.73 At the turn of the twen-
tieth century, American business consisted of manufacturers, wholesalers,
and retailers.74 Wholesalers purchased manufactured goods, selling them to
retailers who, in turn, sold the goods to the public. 75 This trend continued
until after World War I when grocery chain stores began to experience rapid
growth.
76
Chain stores focused on integrating the wholesale and retail functions
of the business model in order to circumvent paying the wholesaler's profit
margin.77 In addition to the integrated business model, chain stores used
centralized purchasing departments to obtain price concessions from manu-
facturers that independent retailers were unable to obtain. 8 Ultimately, the
integrated business model and centralized purchasing system allowed chain
stores to revolutionize the American business model.79
By 1933, chain stores accounted for twenty-five percent of grocery re-
tail sales, up from nine percent in 1926.0 During that same period, indepen-
dent grocers were going out of business at a rate of ten percent per year.81
The Clayton Act made price discrimination an antitrust violation,82 but inde-
pendent merchants had no legal recourse under that Act.83 The Clayton Act
was ineffective at combating secondary-line price discrimination because it
69. Id.
70. See infra Part III.A.
71. See infra Part II.B.
72. See infra Part III.C.
73. PATmAN, supra note 59, at 3.
74. ROWE, supra note 60, at 3.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 4.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. ROWE, supra note 60, at 5.
81. Id.
82. Clinton C. Carter & Kesa M. Johnston, The Robinson-Patman Act: The Law of Price
Discrimination, 64 ALA. LAW. 246,247 (2003).
83. Id.
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allowed a seller to offer a different price based on the quantity of goods
sold.84 Moreover, the Clayton Act covered only competition among sellers,
not among buyers.85
Independent merchants and politicians began to organize against the
chain-store merchants, namely the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company
(A & p).86 As resentment toward the chain stores continued to escalate, both
federal and state governments began to draft legislation to inhibit the growth
of chain stores.8" These legislative attempts ultimately proved ineffective,
and a congressional commission concluded that the chain stores would con-
tinue to grow as long as they continued to offer significantly lower prices
than independent merchants.88
Originally offered as the "Wholesale Grocers Protection Act,"89 Con-
gress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act as an amendment to the Clayton Act
amid concerns that a bill that targeted only the grocery industry would be
constitutionally vulnerable.9 ° The bill amended the Clayton Act to (1) un-
conditionally prohibit price discrimination in interstate commerce and (2)
limit the offering of quantity discounts." Moreover, the bill added a clause
that prohibited price discrimination that adversely affected a competitor's
ability to compete with a person or his customers who received or granted a
discriminatory price.92 The Senate added this language because the original
language, requiring a competitor to show "general injury to competitive
conditions," was too restrictive and failed to protect the competitor injured
by discriminatory pricing.93
84. Id. at 248.
85. Id.
86. Hugh C. Hansen, Robinson-Patman Law: A Review and Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1113, 1122 (1983). Independent merchants attempted to wage economic warfare against
the chain stores by trying to coerce manufacturers not to deal directly with chain stores. See
RowE, supra note 60, at 5-6. These attempts proved unsuccessful because the courts deemed
the independent merchants' actions anticompetitive. Id
87. ROWE, supra note 60, at 8. States began passing legislation that heavily taxed chain
stores or even prohibited chain stores from operating within the state. Id. At the federal level,
Congressman Patman continued his pursuit of chain stores after the Robinson-Patman Act
was enacted, offering first in 1938 and again in 1940 a punitive tax on chain stores that would
have resulted in A & P paying $524 million dollars in federal taxes on $9 million dollars of
net income. Roy G. Blakey & Gladys C. Blakely, Chain Store Taxation, 19 TAXES 594, 628
(1941).
88. ROWE, supra note 60, at 9.
89. Hansen, supra note 86, at 1123.
90. ROWE, supra note 60, at 23. H.B. Teegarden, counsel for the United States Whole-
sale Grocers Association, drafted the bill originally offered in the House by Congressman
Patman. Id. at 11. Ironically, with the exception of the food industry and retail druggist, every
other important business segment opposed the bill. Id. at 22.
91. Id. at 12.
92. Id. at 14.
93. Hansen, supra note 86, at 1123-24.
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Facing strong resentment toward chain stores and minimal opposition,
the bill easily passed the House.94 It faced growing opposition in the Senate,
which resulted in several amendments designed to weaken the bill before the
Senate ultimately passed the bill.95 However, once the bill reached the
House-Senate conference, the differences between the House and Senate bill
were reconciled in favor of the original Patman bill, and President Roosevelt
signed the bill into law on June 19, 1936.96
B. The Economic Ramifications of the Robinson-Patman Act
According to Robert Bork, "no other antitrust statute has been sub-
jected to so steady a barrage of hostile commentary as the Robinson-Patman
Act."97 The statute faced public attack from the Justice Department during
the 1970s when the Department sought to have the Robinson-Patman Act
repealed.98 Although the Justice Department's efforts to repeal the Act were
unsuccessful, the Justice Department continues not to enforce the Act.99 Ac-
cording to Robert Bork, hostile criticism toward the Act is justified because
the goal of the Robinson-Patman Act is to protect competitors, even though
antitrust statutes are designed to protect competition.'00
Theorists believe that price discrimination should be encouraged when
it is attributable to differences in marginal cost because price should be a
function of marginal cost.' Ultimately, sellers should sell their products at
a price equal to marginal cost, thereby optimizing consumer welfare and
allocative efficiency.'0 2 Under the Robinson-Patman Act, however, sellers
must offer a uniform price; otherwise, the seller may be guilty of price dis-
crimination. 3 Although the Act allows a seller to escape liability when the
price difference is attributable to cost, the threat of costly litigation inhibits
sellers from offering different prices."' As a result, prices remain stagnant,
and sellers are unable to adjust prices for changes in market conditions.'0 5
94. ROWE, supra note 60, at 18.
95. Id. at 17.
96. Id. at 19.
97. ROBERTH. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 385 (Free Press 1993) (1978). One critic
has viewed Bork's book as an attempt to persuade courts to use economic theory as the basis
for resolving antitrust disputes, rather than relying on congressional intent. David F. Shores,
Economic Formalism in Antitrust Decision Making, 68 ALB. L. REv. 1053, 1093 (2005).
98. Hansen, supra note 86, at 1115-16.
99. Seeid. at 1116.
100. BORK, supra note 97, at 394.
101. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Market Power and Secondary-Line Differential Pricing, 71
GEO. LI. 1157,1161 (1983).
102. Id.
103. See BORN, supra note 97, at 383.
104. Id. at 389.
105. Id. at 388.
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Although supporters of the Robinson-Patman Act believe price dis-
crimination would allow powerful chain stores to gain a competitive advan-
tage over independent merchants, 10 6 some academics believe sporadic price
discrimination is a sign of healthy competition. 7 Theoretically, large chain
stores are not able to obtain unjustified discounts because the discounts are
available only if the seller offers the product at a price above marginal
cost.'0 8 A seller cannot reduce price below marginal cost because the price
of the product would not cover the cost of the product, thereby causing the
seller to go out of business.1"9 By requiring discount prices, the chain store
will move the price of the product toward marginal cost,"' which, according
to some, is an indication of perfect competition."'
In order to compete with the discriminating seller, a competitor must
lower its prices, which then leads to a series of retaliatory price reductions,
reducing prices for everyone." 2 Larger purchasers do not have exclusive
access to discount purchasing because the smaller purchasers can band to-
gether to negotiate for lower prices."3 If the seller continues to charge the
smaller purchasers with unjustifiably high prices, then the smaller purchas-
ers will find a different seller."4 Therefore, it is theoretically improbable that
price discrimination injures competition between the seller's customers."5
According to Bork, the Robinson-Patman Act is fundamentally flawed
because it equates price differential with price discrimination." 6 However,
the drafters of the Act did not intend mere price differences to create a re-
cognizable injury under the Act." 7 Contrary to the drafters' position, in Fed-
eral Trade Commission v. Morton Salt,"' the Supreme Court interpreted
106. See supra Part III.A.
107. Hovenkamp, supra note 101, at 1170.
108. See BORK, supra note 97, at 389.
109. Hovenkamp, supra note 101, at 1170. The seller would not be able to make up for
the difference in cost by charging higher prices elsewhere because the consumers in the dif-
ferent market would not be willing to buy a product at a price above marginal cost. See
BORK, supra note 97, at 386.
110. See BORK, supra note 97, at 390.
111. Hovenkamp, supra note 101, at 1170.
112. See BORK, supra note 97, at 390.
113. Id.
114. Hovenkamp, supra note 101, at 1170.
115. BORK, supra note 97, at 390.
116. Id. at 399. Price discrimination results when the seller realizes a different ratio of
price to marginal cost on sales to different purchasers of the same product. Id. at 383. Thus, if
a seller offers different prices proportionate to different costs, then the seller is not engaging
in price discrimination. Id. Conversely, if a seller offers a product at a constant price (in spite
of cost differences), then the seller is engaging in discriminatory pricing. Id.
117. Andrew I. Gavil, Secondary-Line Price Discrimination and the Fate of Morton Salt:
To Save It, Let It Go, 48 EMORY. L.J. 1057, 1077 (1999).
118. 334 U.S. 37,45 (1948).
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"price discrimination" to mean a price difference." 9 The fundamental eco-
nomic flaw behind the Robinson-Patman Act is a prohibition on offering
different prices; however, this flaw resulted from judicial interpretation, not
from the statutory text.
20
C. Judicial Development of the Robinson-Patman Act
Hundreds of thousands of pricing decisions are affected every year be-
cause of the Robinson-Patman Act.'2 ' The Act prohibits discriminatory pric-
ing that may injure, destroy, or prevent competition.2 2 This section will ex-
plore three Supreme Court cases that interpreted the Robinson-Patman Act's
injury requirement: Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co.,, J.
Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. ,24 and Texaco Inc. v. Ha-
sbrouck.12
1. The Morton Salt Inference of Price Discrimination
In Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt, a large manufacturer of
table salt offered buyers a lower price per case when the buyer bought more
than a predetermined amount of salt during any consecutive, twelve-month
period. 2 6 Although these discounts were available to all of Morton's cus-
tomers, only five companies purchased enough salt to take advantage of the
discounted price.127 After investigating Morton's quantity-discount pricing,
the Federal Trade Commission issued a cease and desist order, compelling
Morton to discontinue the quantity-discount pricing.'28 The Court deter-
mined that Morton violated the Robinson-Patman Act's prohibition of price
discrimination based upon the commissioner's showing that Morton charged
one customer a higher price than what was charged to one of the customer's
competitors.2 9
The Court recognized that, in theory, the standard discounts offered by
Morton were available to all purchasers, not just to favored purchasers com-
119. Id.
120. See Gavil, supra note 117, at 1063.
121. BORK, supra note 97, at 384.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000).
123. See infra Part III.C.1.
124. See infra Part II1.C.2.
125. See infra Part III.C.3.
126. FTC v. Morton Salt, 334 U.S. 37, 41 (1948).
127. Id. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company was one of the stores capable of
utilizing the quantity discounts. Id.
128. Seeid. at40.
129. Id. at 45.
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peting with disfavored purchasers. 3 ° Despite this fact, the record indicated
that no individual merchant had purchased enough table salt to utilize Mor-
ton's standard discounts.13 ' As the Court noted, the legislative history of the
Robinson-Patman Act showed that the purpose of the Act was to prevent a
large purchaser from obtaining favorable pricing discounts solely because of
the large buyer's ability to purchase large quantities."' As a result, the Court
determined that Morton's standard pricing practices were discriminatory
under the Robinson-Patman Act. 133
Furthermore, the Court held that the Robinson-Patman Act does not re-
quire that price discrimination in fact harm competition; rather, it requires
that price discrimination create a reasonable possibility of injury to competi-
tion.'34 The Court believed that it was "self-evident ... that there is a 'rea-
sonable possibility' that competition may be adversely affected by a practice
under which manufacturers and producers sell their goods to some custom-
ers substantially cheaper than they sell like goods to the competitors of these
customers."'3 According to the Court, in order to establish an injury to
competition under the Robinson-Patman Act, a party simply has to show
that a manufacturer's price differential resulted in a substantially lower re-
sale price among competitors.
36
In Morton Salt, the Court relied in part on the legislative history to hold
that Morton injured competition and engaged in prohibited price discrimina-
tion by offering different purchasers substantially different prices for like
goods.'37 Some commentators have argued that this inference, referred to as
the "Morton Salt inference," furthers Congress's prophylactic intent in pass-
ing the Robinson-Patman Act.3 8 However, a plaintiff must still prove more
than the Morton Salt inference in order to recover damages under the Act.'39
2. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.: Limiting the Appli-
cation of the Morton Salt Inference
In J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., a new and used auto-
mobile dealer alleged that Chrysler engaged in price discrimination by hold-
ing J. Truett Payne to a higher automobile sales objective than Payne's
130. Id. at42.
131. Id
132. Morton, 334 U.S. at 43.
133. Id. at 44.
134. Id. at 46.
135. Id. at 50.
136. See id. at 46-47.
137. Id. at 45.
138. Harry Ballan, Note, The Courts 'Assault on the Robinson-Patman Act, 92 COLUM. L.
REv. 634, 634 (1992).
139. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 562 (1981).
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competitors.' 40 Chrysler offered dealers a cash-back bonus for every vehicle
the dealer sold in excess of a predetermined sales objective.' 4' Payne argued
that Chrysler's sales objective program was a form of price discrimination
because competitor-dealers received a lower price on vehicles from Chrysler
to the extent that they had a lower sales objective.' 42 Payne further con-
tended that he was entitled to automatic damages to the extent that he
proved price discrimination.' 43 Although Payne failed to establish a cogniz-
able injury, Payne argued that the jury should be able to infer injury in a
civil case, similar to how injury is inferred in an injunctive suit.1"
The Court rejected Payne's argument and declined to extend the Mor-
ton Salt inference to private suits involving monetary damages. "4 In order
for a plaintiff to recover treble damages, the plaintiff must show that an ac-
tual injury resulted from an activity prohibited by the antitrust laws.' 46 A
mere showing of price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act is
insufficient because it establishes only that an injury may result, not that an
injury did result.'47
In J Truett Payne, the Court recognized that the Morton Salt inference
gives rise to a Robinson-Patman violation, but it declined to extend this infe-
rence to private parties seeking treble damages. 48 From here, the Court be-
gan to limit the Morton Salt inference as it applied to Robinson-Patman al-
legations.
49
3. Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck: Further Limitations on the Morton
Salt Inference
In upholding a secondary-line price discrimination suit against Texaco,
the Court recognized that the Morton Salt inference is inapplicable in cases
involving functional discounts. 5 ° Texaco sold gasoline to independent re-
tailers and gasoline distributors5 ' The gasoline distributors picked up the
gasoline from Texaco's plant, while Texaco delivered the gasoline to the
140. Id. at 560.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 561.
144. Id.
145. J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 561.
146. Id. at 562.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 561.
149. Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 571 (1990).
150. Id. A functional discount is offered to a wholesaler due to the wholesaler's function
in the distribution chain. Ballan, supra note 138, at 643.
151. Texaco, 496 U.S. at 547-48.
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independent retailers. 5 ' As a result, the gasoline distributors received a
cheaper price for gasoline than the independent retailers.'53
The Court reasoned that when a seller offers a reduction in price as a
functional discount, the seller no longer has the burden of proving a cost-
justification defense.'54 Whereas a cost-justification defense requires the
seller to prove that the difference in price is warranted, the plaintiff must
prove that a competitive injury occurred when a seller offered a functional
discount.'55 In Texaco, the Court upheld Hasbrouck's price discrimination
claim because Hasbrouck was able to present sufficient evidence to prove
the illegitimacy of Texaco's functional discounts.'56
The Court recognized, however, that anticompetitive effects could not
be presumed in the case of functional discounts because most functional
discounts are legitimate and do not harm competition. 157 Indeed, as the Court
observed, most functional discounts simply resemble a reimbursement for
the functional cost assumed by the wholesaler. 58 Although courts should
assume functional discounts are legitimate, the Robinson-Patman Act prohi-
bits discounts when a plaintiff proves the discounts have anticompetitive
effects.'59 In Texaco, the Court continued to limit the applicability of the
Morton Salt inference, a trend the Court continued in Volvo. 6'
IV. REASONING
On January 10, 2006, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Reeder-Simco v. Volvo and remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings. 6' Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of
the court. 62 She was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer,
Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter163 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Thomas, filed a dissenting opinion." 4 This section will first analyze Justice
152. Id. at 549.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 561. The Court recognized that although the Robinson-Patman Act allows a
seller to offer a cost justification defense (that is, difference in price is commensurate with the
difference in cost), the defense is difficult to prove as a practical matter and is often unsuc-
cessful. Id. at 561 n.18.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 570.
157. Texaco, 496 U.S. at 571.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 126 S. Ct. 860, 870 (2006).
161. Id. at 873.
162. Id. at 866.
163. Id. at 865.
164. Id.
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Ginsburg's majority decision'65 and then Justice Stevens's dissenting opi-
nion."'
A. Justice Ginsburg's Majority Opinion
Justice Ginsburg began her opinion by briefly explaining the facts of
the case, the decision of the lower court, and the Court's holding.'67 The
Court determined that Reeder did not have a valid claim under the Robin-
son-Patman Act because competition among bidders for special order prod-
ucts is not the type of competition protected by the Act.'68
After her brief announcement of the Court's holding, Justice Ginsburg
gave an overview of the facts and issues of the case and then an overview of
the Robinson-Patman Act.'69 In the next section, the Court analyzed the facts
of the case vis-A-vis the requirements necessary to recover under the Robin-
son-Patman Act. 170 Justice Ginsburg concluded the majority opinion by jux-
taposing Reeder's case with the theoretical concerns of antitrust laws.'
7 1
1. Issues
Justice Ginsburg framed the issue as whether a manufacturer can "be
held liable for secondary-line price discrimination under the Robinson-
Patman Act in the absence of a showing that the manufacturer discriminated
between dealers competing to resell its product to the same retail custom-
er.' ' 172 Resolving the issue in the negative, Justice Ginsburg's analysis began
by outlining the purpose and requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act.'73
2. The Robinson-Patman Act
Justice Ginsburg noted that Congress designed the Robinson-Patman
Act to prevent large chain stores from obtaining lower prices than smaller
buyers. 74 According to Ginsburg, the Robinson-Patman Act was not de-
signed to prevent all price differences; rather, it was intended to prevent
165. See infra V.A.
166. See infra V.B.
167. See Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 866.
168. Id. The Court recognized that Reeder did have a valid state law claim. Id. However,
this note is focusing solely on the Robinson-Patman Act issue. See supra note 19.
169. See Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 866-70.
170. See id. at 870-72.
171. See id. at 872-73.
172. Id. at 869.
173. Id. at 869-70.
174. Id. at 869.
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price discrimination that threatened or injured competition. 75 Generally,
courts have recognized three types of price discrimination: primary-line,
secondary-line, and tertiary-line.'76 The Court noted that Reeder's case in-
volved secondary-line price discrimination.'77
In order to show secondary-line price discrimination, Reeder was re-
quired to show that (1) the truck sales occurred in interstate commerce, (2)
"the trucks were of 'like grade and quality,"' (3) Volvo offered discrimina-
tory prices among Reeder and other Volvo purchasers, and (4) the price dis-
crimination injured competition.'78 Although it was undisputed that Reeder
satisfied the first two requirements, the third and fourth requirements re-
mained at issue.'
79
The threshold inquiry in resolving whether an injury to competition has
occurred is whether sales and profits have been diverted from the disfavored
purchaser to a favored purchaser. 8 ' Although courts can infer an injury to
competition when a favored purchaser receives a substantially lower price
for a long period, the court cannot infer the requisite injury if the favored
and disfavored purchasers were not direct competitors.' 8'
3. Reeder's Case
Although the Eighth Circuit concluded that Reeder presented sufficient
evidence that Volvo's pricing practices resulted in competitive injury, the
Supreme Court concluded that Reeder's evidence did not prove the type of
injury prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act. 182 Even though Reeder of-
fered three scenarios of competitive injury, Justice Ginsburg analyzed Reed-
er's evidence in two categories: (1) discrimination among non-competing
dealers and (2) discrimination between competing dealers.'83
a. Discrimination among non-competing dealers
First, Reeder's evidence of price discrimination between non-
competing Volvo dealers was insufficient because Reeder was not directly
competing with other dealers for the same customers. 8 4 Instead, Reeder's
evidence showed that Volvo offered different prices to different dealers
175. Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 870.
176. Id; see also discussion supra Part III.
177. Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 870.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 871.
183. Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 871.
184. Id.
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competing for different customers." 5 Given Reeder's evidence, the Court
declined to infer competitive injury because the evidence did not prove that
a favored dealer was capable of manipulating the market to the detriment of
the disfavored purchaser.'86
In Reeder's case, a favored purchaser could not manipulate the market
to harm a disfavored purchaser because the two purchasers were not com-
peting against each other.'87 Although Volvo dealers may sell outside of
their geographic area, this does not mean that the dealers competed against
each other for specific customer sales.'88
Instead, Volvo dealers competed against each other for the opportunity
to bid on a particular customer's business. 9 Volvo's pricing practices could
not injure competition for the opportunity to bid because Volvo did not offer
a price concession until after the dealer was awarded the opportunity to
bid.' Once a dealer began the competitive bidding process, the market be-
came isolated to a particular customer, with only a few dealers competing
for the sale.'91 An inference of competitive injury, however, arises only
when there is evidence of substantial discrimination between competing
purchasers.'92 Thus, competitive injury could not be inferred in Reeder's
case because Reeder and another Volvo dealer did not compete for the same
customer's business.
93
b. Discrimination among competing dealers
Even if Reeder did compete against other Volvo dealers for the same
customer, the Court still could not infer competitive injury because Reeder
failed to establish being disfavored for a substantial period as compared to
other Volvo dealers.1 94 In one instance, Reeder lost a deal that would have
resulted in $30,000 of gross profit. 95 In another instance, neither Reeder nor
the dealer who received the higher price concession won the customer's
business.'9 6 Thus, according to the Court, even if Volvo engaged in price
185. Id.
186. See id. Furthermore, the Court noted that Reeder's evidence led to the possibility
that situations could have existed in which Reeder was the favored purchaser. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 871.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 872.
193. Seeid
194. Id.
195. Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 872.
196. Id.
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discrimination, the price discrimination did not substantially affect competi-
tion between Reeder and other Volvo dealers competing for the same sale.' 97
4. Reeder's Case and the Broader Purposes ofAntitrust Laws
In rejecting Reeder's Robinson-Patman Act claim, the Court continued
to interpret the Act consistently with the purpose of antitrust laws. 98 Ac-
cording to the Court, Reeder's interpretation of the Act was not in accord
with the broader goals of antitrust laws because it protected competitors
rather than stimulating competition.'99 Volvo's pricing practices, however,
were in accord with the broader goals of antitrust laws because the pricing
practices stimulated competition among different suppliers. 00 Although
Justice Ginsburg concluded that the Court's holding in Volvo furthered the
broader antitrust policies,' the dissenting justices believed that it aban-
doned the statutory text of the Robinson-Patman Act. 202
B. Justice Stevens's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens began his dissenting opinion by arguing that the Robin-
son-Patman Act protected franchise dealers from price discrimination re-
gardless of whether the franchise dealers competed against one another.0 3
He concluded that the Robinson-Patman Act should have protected Reeder
from price discrimination in this case."°
Justice Stevens's Robinson-Patman analysis relied on two uncontested
findings of the trial court: (1) that Volvo engaged in price discrimination
and (2) that Reeder and other Volvo dealers were competitors.2 5 Ever since
Morton Salt, juries have inferred competitive injury under the Robinson-
Patman Act when a manufacturer offered one purchaser a lower price than a
competing purchaser.2 6 Moreover, courts have recognized that distributors
in a single retail market are competitors with other distributors.2 7 Applying
197. Id. The Court declined the opportunity to determine if the Robinson-Patman Act
applied to instances of head-to-head competition; rather, the Court assumed the Act applied
to such situations. Id.
198. Id. at 873.
199. Id. at 872.
200. See id.
201. Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 873.
202. See id. at 876 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 873.
204. Id.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 875.
207. See Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 875.
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these principles, the Court should have affirmed the Eighth Circuit's deci-
208sion.
According to Justice Stevens, Reeder presented sufficient evidence that
Volvo charged Reeder higher prices over a long period and that these higher
prices inhibited Reeder's ability to compete with other purchasers.2 9 Justice
Stevens believed that this was enough to establish injury to competition be-
cause neither the statute nor the Court's precedent required an injury to
competition on a transactional basis.
210
A transactional approach to determining competitive injury requires a
disfavored purchaser to compete directly against a favored purchaser for the
same sale.21 In Justice Stevens's opinion, Justice Ginsburg ignored the Mor-
ton Salt inference by making direct competition a prerequisite to recover
under the Robinson-Patman Act.2t2 Under Morton Salt, courts can infer
competitive injury when a purchaser lost profits relative to a competitor, but
in this case, Justice Ginsburg negated this inference absent head-to-head
competition. 23 As a result, Justice Stevens concluded that Justice Ginsburg
gave "short shrift to the Robinson-Patman Act's prophylactic intent," and in
the process, abandoned the statutory text of the Act.214
V. SIGNIFICANCE
In Volvo, the Court denied Reeder's Robinson-Patman claim because
Reeder failed to establish that Volvo's pricing practices substantially injured
competition between Reeder and a direct competitor.21 5 Had the Court fol-
lowed Morton Salt's sole directive, the Court would have inferred the requi-
site injury due to the different prices offered among various Volvo deal-
ers. 216 The Court would have inferred the injury regardless of whether Reed-
er directly competed against the other Volvo dealers.217 Under Volvo, how-
ever, a plaintiff must prove that a manufacturer substantially injured compe-
tition by offering purchasers competing for the same sale different prices.21
This is significant because the Court narrowed the application of the Robin-
208. See id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 876.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 876.
214. Id. While Justice Stevens admitted that the Robinson-Patman Act was not sound
economic policy, he still believed the particular facts of this case warranted enforcement of
the Act. Id.
215. Seeid. at872.
216. See discussion supra Part III.C.I.
217. See discussion supra Part III.C. 1.
218. See discussion supra Part IV.A.3.b.
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son-Patman Act by requiring a plaintiff to prove more than the Morton Salt
inference. 19
Arguably, the legislative branch should have the task of narrowing the
application of the Robinson-Patman Act;220 however, the Supreme Court
correctly narrowed the Act in Volvo for two reasons. First, the broad appli-
cation of the Robinson-Patman Act was the result of flawed judicial inter-
pretation, not the statute's language.22' Second, strong public resentment
toward large corporations makes legislative action unlikely.2 22 This section
examines both reasons to show why the Supreme Court reached the correct
result in Volvo. The next part analyzes the soundness of having the judiciary
correct unsound antitrust policy.
A. Correcting Previous Judicial Interpretations
In deciding Morton Salt, the Court declared that a substantial price dif-
ference among purchasers sufficiently established an injury to competi-
tion.223 However, the Court's declaration directly contradicted the plain lan-
guage of the statute and the legislative intent behind the statute.224 The Ro-
binson-Patman Act explicitly prohibits price discrimination, but judicial
interpretation has construed price discrimination to mean price differen-
tial.225 By definition, price discrimination requires a seller to realize a differ-
ent rate of return on the sale of the same product to different purchasers.226
Conversely, price differential results when a seller offers a product at a dif-
ferent price.227
The drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act sought to prohibit price dis-
crimination out of fear that large chain stores would coerce distributors to
accept lower profit margins in exchange for a higher volume of sales.2 ' Al-
though differential pricing can result in lower profit margins, it does not
necessarily do so.2 29 If a seller offers a product at a different price due to a
different cost, then the seller has not discriminated in price because the prof-
219. See Zwisler, supra note 7, at 43 (discussing how the Court's decision will further
limit the number of cases brought under the Robinson-Patman Act).
220. Id.
221. See Gavil, supra note 117, at 384.
222. Hansen, supra note 86, at 1117.
223. See discussion supra Part III.A.
224. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the statutory text of the Act and the draf-
ters' intent in drafting the Act).
225. See discussion supra Part III.B.
226. See discussion supra Part III.B.
227. See discussion supra Part III.B.
228. See discussion supra Part III.A.
229. See supra note 116.
[Vol. 29
ANTITRUST
it margin remains the same.23° Conversely, if the seller offers a product at
the same price regardless of the cost involved, then the seller is engaging in
price discrimination because the profit margin has changed. 23' By interpret-
ing the Robinson-Patman Act to prohibit price differential rather than price
discrimination, the Morton Court simply misapplied the Act.232
Although Congressional action could have corrected the judiciary's
mistake in Morton Salt, there was no impetus for Congress to act.233 The
United States Justice Department has not enforced the Act since 1975,234 and
plaintiffs have had increasing difficulty prevailing under the Act in civil
suits. 235 Due to the Act's sparse enforcement, there has been no incentive for
the legislature to repeal it.2
36
Although the legislature did not have an incentive to narrow the broad
application of the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court did have an incentive to
narrow the application of the Act. The breadth of the Act was the result of
the Court's decision in Morton Salt, not the statutory text.237 Thus, it was
appropriate for the Court to limit Morton Salt so that the Act prohibits true
secondary-line price discrimination among direct competitors, not simple
price differentiation. 238 Although an amendment to the Robinson-Patman
Act is one method to limit Morton Salt,239 such an amendment is improbable
given strong public resentment toward large chain stores. 240 Therefore, the
approach taken in Volvo was the most efficient means of correcting the er-
roneous interpretation of the Act in Morton Salt.
230. See supra note 116.
231. See supra note 116.
232. The Court in Morton Salt was aware of the distinction between price discrimination
and price differential but chose to supplant price discrimination with price differential in
order to give effect to what the Court believed to be Congress's intent. See FTC v. Morton
Salt, 334 U.S. 37, 45 (1948).
233. Hansen, supra note 86, at 1118.
234. Id. at 1115-18.
235. See discussion supra Part III.C.ii-iii.
236. The Antitrust Modernization Commission concluded that Congress should repeal the
Act; however, Congress has yet to act on the Commission's findings. See Zwisler, supra note
7, at 41.
237. See discussion supra Part III.C.I.
238. See Gavil, supra note 117, at 1062 (advocating for a change in judicial interpretation
of the Robinson-Patman Act rather than the repeal or amendment of the Act); see also Kmeic,
supra note 1, at 1468 (discussing a theory that the United States Supreme Court has a consti-
tutional duty to overrule erroneous precedents in certain instances).
239. See Hansen, supra note 86, at 1201.
240. Id. at 1117.
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B. Public Resentment Toward Large Chain Stores
Although economic theorists agree that the Court's application of the
Robinson-Patman Act prior to Volvo promoted unsound antitrust policy,24'
supporters of the Act believe the Act is necessary to protect small business-
es. 242 Indeed, at a public hearing in 2005 to discuss the fate of the Robinson-
Patman Act, academics spoke against the statute, while those representing
small business owners spoke in its favor.243 Additionally, large chain store
operations are still subject to strong public resentment.244 For example, Ar-
kansas-based Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. accounts for approximately one-fifth of
the groceries sold in the United States, with its customers saving nearly se-
venteen percent compared to customers of other grocery stores.2 45 Despite
these apparent benefits to consumers, unions and politicians are quick to
demonize Wal-Mart.246 Moreover, the Chicago City Council recently passed
a bill aimed at preventing Wal-Mart from operating within the city of Chi-
cago.24
7
Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act to protect small businesses
from large chain stores similar to Wal-Mart. 248 As a result, legislative at-
tempts to repeal the Robinson-Patman Act may focus on allegations of cur-
rying favor with big business, rather than focusing on sound economic prin-
ciples.249 Pro-union groups will likely begin lobbying to protect the Robin-
son-Patman Act, forcing members of Congress to take a side on the i'ssue.250
The union groups were successful in preventing Wal-Mart, a store that pro-
vides substantial savings to consumers, from operating within Chicago.251
Therefore, it is conceivable that union groups and the political process
would thwart any Congressional effort to repeal the Robinson-Patman
Act.
252
241. See discussion supra Part III.B.
242. Hansen, supra note 86, at 1117.
243. Robinson-Patman Act: Before the Antitrust Modernization Committee, 109th Cong.,
6-22 (2005).
244. See George F. Will, Editorial, Democrats vs. Wal-Mart, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2006,
at A2 1.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See discussion supra Part III.A.
249. This is evidenced by the fact that immediate opposition from the House of Repre-
sentatives met the Justice Department's attempt to repeal the act in the 1970s. See Hansen,
supra note 86, at 1116.
250. See id. (discussing previous opposition to legislative attempts to amend or revoke the
Robinson-Patman Act).
251. See generally Will, supra note 244.
252. During the 1970s the Justice Department recruited several pro-consumer groups,
including one led by Ralph Nader, to support an amendment to the Robinson-Patman Act;
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Recently, the Antitrust Modernization Committee recommended to
Congress the complete repeal of the Robinson-Patman Act.253 Similar com-
mittees reached the same conclusion in 1969 and 1997, yet the Act remains
an anomaly in antitrust jurisprudence.2 4 Ultimately, the committee resolved
that the Act is fundamentally inconsistent with the goals of antitrust, and it
is detrimental to consumer welfare.2 5' Although an outright repeal of the Act
is the most efficacious method for resolving the conflict inherent in the
Act,256 the Court's decision in Volvo was appropriate nonetheless. Congress
did not adopt the recommendations of similar committees in the past, and
there is no guarantee that Congress will accept the most recent recommenda-
tions to repeal the Act.
In Volvo, the Court was able to sidestep the political process and limit
the Robinson-Patman Act to those instances in which an injury actually oc-
curred, a result that the legislature might not have been able to reach.257 An
argument could be made that the Court inappropriately prevented the politi-
cal process from running its course,258 but such an argument ignores the fact
that the Court was responsible for the breadth of Robinson-Patman Act.259
Ideally, the public should evaluate antitrust policy because it is the product
of legislative action;2 however, the pedantic banter of antitrust theory does
not resonate with the public.26 Instead, proponents of the Robinson-Patman
Act believe that the Act protects small businesses.262 Although the Act ulti-
mately harms consumers, the proof of the harmful effect is not strong
enough to waver support for small business.263 As a result, legislative action
to correct this unsound antitrust policy was unlikely.2" After Volvo, howev-
however, the pro-consumer groups declined to support the amendment, even though it is
undisputed that the act artificially inflated consumer prices. Hansen, supra note 86, at 1118.
253. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMITTEE, 110th Cong., REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 312 (Comm. Print 2007).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See id. (discussing the futility of attempting to reconcile the Act with the broader
goals of antitrust policy through piecemeal judicial interpretation).
257. Although the Antitrust Modernization Committee recommended repeal of the Act,
there is no guarantee that Congress will adopt the commission's findings.
258. See Zwisler, supra note 7, at 43.
259. It is not unprecedented for the United States Supreme Court to overrule existing
precedent, regardless of what action the legislature is taking on the issue. See Kmiec, supra
note 1, at 1468 (discussing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey and Lawrence v. Texas in which the Court did not follow prior precedent).
260. See Hansen, supra note 86, at 1213.
261. Seeid. at 1118.
262. Id. at 1117.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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er, the judiciary remains a viable vehicle to correct unsound antitrust policy
despite political opposition to judicial activism.265
C. The Judiciary's Role in Interpreting Antitrust Policy
Ultimately, Volvo will have little impact on Robinson-Patman Act liti-
gation. Prior to Volvo, the Justice Department had not enforced the Act for
decades,266 and plaintiffs were rarely successful in civil cases. 267 Volvo will
not change this trend. Instead, Volvo is significant because the Court limited
a fifty-seven-year-old precedent and limited a seventy-year-old act of Con-
gress. By limiting the breadth of the Robinson-Patman Act, an act widely
viewed as unsound antitrust policy, 268 Volvo shows that the Court is the ap-
propriate branch to correct flawed antitrust policy.
Although there was not a public outcry to repeal the Robinson-Patman
Act, it is not clear whether the public's silence represents support or apathy
for the Act. Antitrust policy is not easy to comprehend, and it is unlikely
that the public would engage in a serious dialogue over antitrust policy.
2 69
Moreover, organized opposition to large corporations often results in mis-
leading marketing campaigns intended to sway public opinion and prevent a
candid dialogue about the relevant issues.27 °
Both of these factors could prevent the public from making an in-
formed evaluation of antitrust policy, 271 but these factors are less likely to
influence the judiciary. 22 There is a possibility that judges will rely on
flawed economic analysis 273 however, this potential risk of harm is not as
great as the actual harm that results when judges do not act. Without ques-
tion, the Robinson-Patman Act is detrimental to consumers by subjecting
them to higher prices. 274 Despite this fact, Congress has yet to amend or re-
peal the act.275 As a result, judicial action was imperative to ensure that the
Robinson-Patman Act benefits consumers, not competitors.
265. See George W. Bush, President of the United States, Remarks at Georgia Victory
2006 Rally (Oct. 30, 2006) (denouncing judicial activism).
266. Id.
267. See discussion supra Part IlI.C.2-3.
268. See discussion supra Part III.B.
269. Hansen, supra note 86, at 1117-18.
270. See generally Will, supra note 244 (describing an advertisement against Coca-Cola
intended to influence public opinion).
271. See Hansen, supra note 86, at 1117-18.
272. But see Shores, supra note 97, at 1093-95 (discussing reasons against courts relying
on economic theory in resolving antitrust disputes).
273. Id. at 1094.
274. Hansen, supra note 86, at 1118.
275. Zwisler, supra note 7, at 41.
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Volvo is significant because it shows a willingness by the Court to cor-
rect unsound antitrust policy when Congress was unwilling or slow to do so.
By addressing a flaw in antitrust policy relative to price discrimination, the
Court in Volvo ultimately paved the way for the Court to interpret antitrust
policies so that such policies will protect consumers, not competitors. In the
process, the Court did what previous courts and Congress were unwilling to
do: interpret the Robinson-Patman Act so that it promotes healthy competi-
tion."'
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